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It is discussed whether hybrid strategies are beneficial or detrimental to a firm’s 
performance, because hybrid strategies lead to organizational tensions that arise 
from the simultaneous pursuit of distinct strategic activities. However, existing stu-
dies on the relationship between hybrid strategy and firm performance have largely 
neglected the role of the organizational architecture. This study tests the hypothesis 
that an ambidextrous organizational architecture positively moderates the relation-
ship between a hybrid strategy and firm performance. Particularly, the roles of spe-
cific organization structures and HRM practices (individual ambidexterity) and in-
formation  and  communication  technologies  (technological  ambidexterity)  are  as-
sessed. Further, a hybrid strategy’s performance impact is defined in two distinct 
ways and measured relative to three different comparison groups, that is, the entire 
sample, no-emphasis strategies, and pure strategies. A novel multi-source dataset on 
German  and  Polish  manufacturing  firms  is  constructed  from  three  independent 
sources, including a dataset on objective firm performance indicators. Evidence is 
found that a hybrid strategy positively impacts firm performance in the presence of 
organizational ambidexterity, but negatively impacts firm performance in the ab-
sence of organizational ambidexterity. These findings are robust across two types of 
organizational  ambidexterity,  three  different  comparison  groups,  and  further  ro-
bustness tests. 
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A  central  concern  of  strategic  management  involves  the  composition  of  corporate  strategy. 
Strategy scholars suggest that firms must choose their strategy mix from two distinct types of 
strategic activities, namely, exploration and exploitation. Exploration is targeted at the develop-
ment of new and unique product market domains, while exploitation is targeted at efficiency and 
improvements in existing product market domains.  
Much discussion has been dedicated to whether the pursuit of a hybrid strategy that com-
bines exploration and exploitation is beneficial or detrimental to a firm’s performance. Some 
scholars argue that hybrid strategies negatively affect firm performance because of the insur-
mountable organizational tensions that arise from the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and 
exploitation (Porter, 1980; 1985; 1996). Others argue that these organizational tensions are 
solvable, and that hybrid strategies have a positive performance effect equal to (Miles and Snow, 
1978) or greater than that of pure strategies (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), provided that suita-
ble organizational arrangements are in place. 
The empirical findings on the relationship between hybrid strategy and performance are di-
verse and range from a positive effect (Spanos, Zaralis, and Lioukas, 2004; Uotila et al., 2009) to 
no effect (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004) to a negative effect (Thornhill and White, 2007). 
However, these results must be interpreted with caution because studies have largely neglected 
the role of organizational architecture. Moreover, a hybrid strategy’s performance impact is in-
consistently defined in these studies. I argue that any analysis of the relationship between hybr-
id strategy and performance must take into account organizational architecture, as it moderates 
the impact of hybrid strategies on firm performance. I argue that an ambidextrous organization-
al architecture is required to manage the tensions resulting from the simultaneous pursuit of 
exploration and exploitation. I analyze two different ways to achieve organizational ambidexter-
ity. Individual ambidexterity concerns the potential of organizational structures and human re-
source management (HRM) practices to enable individual employees to pursue both exploratory 
and exploitative activities. Technological ambidexterity concerns the potential of information 
and communication technology (ICT) to support the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and 2 
 
exploitation.  Further,  I  argue  that  different  definitions  of  the  performance  impact  of  hybrid 
strategies must be employed to draw meaningful conclusions. The performance impact of hybrid 
strategies can be evaluated in comparison to all firms or in comparison to firms with a pure 
strategy, that is, a strategy with a clear emphasis on either exploration or exploitation. Further, 
firms with a no-emphasis strategy, that is, firms that lack any strategic emphasis, can serve as a 
reference group.  
To test my hypotheses, I employ a novel multi-source dataset. I match data on objective firm 
performance indicators and on ICT with data on corporate strategy, and organizational architec-
ture. I find that the impact of a hybrid strategy on firm performance is positive in the presence of 
organizational ambidexterity, while it is negative in the absence of organizational ambidexterity. 
Further, I find that hybrid strategies outperform the entire sample and no-emphasis strategies in 
presence of organizational ambidexterity, but that hybrid strategies underperform the entire 
sample and are equal in performance to no-emphasis strategies in the absence of organizational 
ambidexterity. Finally, I find that hybrid strategies match the performance of pure strategies in 
the  presence  of  organizational  ambidexterity,  but  that  hybrid  strategies  underperform  pure 
strategies in the absence of organizational ambidexterity.  
This study contributes to theory and practice in several ways. First, by taking into account the 
moderating effect of organizational architecture, this study is more theoretically grounded than 
prior empirical studies. Second, by utilizing different definitions of a hybrid strategy’s perfor-
mance effect, the relative advantages and disadvantages of a hybrid are elaborated in more de-
tail than in prior studies. Third, connections between the largely separated literatures on strate-
gy typologies and organizational ambidexterity are explored. Fourth, the potential of ICT in en-
hancing the performance effects of hybrid strategies is analyzed by introducing the concept of 
technological ambidexterity. 
In the following section, 2, I present the theoretical and empirical background of this study 
and develop the hypotheses to be tested. In section 3, I describe the methods, data, and meas-
ures that are employed. In section 4, I discuss the results. In the final section, 5, I present conclu-
sions for researchers and practitioners as well as directions for future research. 3 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
Hybrid strategy, organizational architecture, and firm performance in theory 
The right composition of corporate strategy is the central concern of strategy typologies. The 
typologies of Porter (1980; 1985), Miles and Snow (1978), and March (1991) have received the 
most attention; together, the three typologies share two broad similarities. The first similarity is 
the idea that firms have to choose their strategy mix from two distinct strategic emphases. Por-
ter (1980; 1985) distinguishes between a differentiation and a cost leadership strategy, while 
Miles and Snow (1978) distinguish between a prospector and a defender strategy. Finally, March 
(1991) distinguishes between an exploration and an exploitation strategy. I use March’s (1991) 
terms in the following. The second similarity is that the typologies advance hypotheses regard-
ing the performance outcomes of different strategy mixes.  
According to Porter (1980; 1985), differentiation and cost leadership strategies each require 
a total commitment to distinct organizational arrangements, making the pursuit of a hybrid 
strategy a ‘recipe for below-average performance’ (Porter, 1985: 16). Firms with a hybrid strat-
egy suffer from a need for a conflicting set of organizational arrangements and are thus ‘stuck in 
the middle’ (Porter, 1980: 41). In contrast, Miles and Snow (1978) introduce a hybrid analyzer 
strategy that ‘combines the strengths of both the Prospector and the Defender’ (Miles and Snow, 
1978: 68). The analyzer strategy demands a ‘delicate balance’ between distinct organizational 
structures and processes and a management that is ‘continually vigilant’ (Miles and Snow, 1978: 
68). However, given separate organizational units with different structures and processes for 
exploration and exploitation, the analyzer strategy is an equal alternative to pure strategies with 
respect to achieving superior firm performance (Miles and Snow, 1978). March (1991) recogniz-
es that exploration and exploitation require different organizational forms and also that focusing 
on either exploration or exploitation is only possible at the expense of the other. A pure explorer 
‘will ordinarily suffer from the fact that it never gains the returns of its knowledge’ due to a nev-
er-ending sequence of unrewarded search and change, while a pure exploiter ‘will ordinarily 
suffer from obsolescence’ due to a reduced responsiveness to environmental changes (Levinthal 
and March, 1993: 105). Following this insight, Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) state in their ambi-4 
 
dexterity premise that ‘firms capable of simultaneously pursuing exploitation and exploration 
are more likely to achieve superior performance than firms emphasizing one at the expense of 
the other’ (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008: 392). The capability to leverage a hybrid strategy re-
sults from setting up an ambidextrous organization that hosts ‘multiple contradictory structures, 
processes, and cultures within the same firm’ (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996: 24). Tushman and 
O’Reilly (1996) emphasize that it is difficult to manage the organizational tensions between ex-
ploration and exploitation. These authors implicitly argue that for firms without suitable organi-
zational arrangements, the performance effects of a hybrid strategy can be negative (He and 
Wong, 2004).  
In summary, the most influential strategy typologies agree that hybrid strategies produce 
considerable organizational tensions, but differ with regard to the solvability of these tensions.  
Hybrid strategy, organizational architecture, and firm performance in empirical studies 
The findings of empirical studies on the hybrid strategy-performance link range from a negative 
performance impact of hybrid strategies to no significant to a positive impact (Table 1).  
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 
----------------------------- 
I argue that these ambiguous results must be interpreted with caution due two reasons.  
First, with regard to methodology, the empirical studies outlined above employ different de-
finitions of a hybrid strategy’s performance impact. The studies using March’s (1991) strategy 
typology concentrate on whether hybrid strategies positively affect firm performance at all. In 
contrast, most studies on Porter’s (1980; 1985) and Miles and Snow’s (1978) typologies com-
pare the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy with the average performance of 
different comparison groups. Specifically, firms with a hybrid strategy are compared with all 
firms, that is, the entire sample of firms of the respective study. Further, firms with a hybrid 
strategy are compared with firms that pursue a no-emphasis strategy or with firms that pursue a 
pure strategy. These inconsistencies make prior findings hard to compare.  5 
 
Second, with regard to theory, the empirical studies largely do not factor in organizational ar-
chitecture, at least not in a way that is consistent with theory. As outlined above, some strategy 
typologies suggest that hybrid strategies positively affect firm performance, provided that there 
are suitable organizational mechanisms to manage the tensions from the simultaneous pursuit 
of exploration and exploitation (that is, organizational ambidexterity). In contrast, hybrid strate-
gies negatively affect firm performance in the absence of suitable organizational arrangements 
(He and Wong, 2004). Thus, the effect of hybrid strategies on firm performance is moderated by 
organizational ambidexterity which affects the strength and direction of the relationship be-
tween predictor variable (hybrid strategy) and dependent variable (firm performance). Thus, 
the many studies that do not consider organizational ambidexterity do not distinguish between 
the level at which the tension between exploration and exploitation is caused (that is, corporate 
strategy) and the level at which the conflict is resolved (that is, organizational architecture). 
Implicitly and counterintuitively, these studies assume that strategies are always supported by 
the right organizational architecture.1 In the few studies that incorporate organizational ambi-
dexterity, the hybrid strategy is seen as a mediator between organizational ambidexterity and 
firm performance. Thus, organizational ambidexterity is seen as an antecedent of the hybrid 
strategy, but it is still the hybrid strategy per se that is assumed to lead to superior performance 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006).  
Organizational ambidexterity 
How to create an ambidextrous organizational architecture that reconciles the contradictions 
between exploration and exploitation has been answered in different ways. 
                                                           
1 This is also reflected by the terminology of many studies using March’s (1991) typology. There, the term 
ambidexterity is used to describe a hybrid strategy (Cao et al., 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Thornhill and 
White, 2007; Uotila et al., 2009; Venkatraman et al., 2007). In contrast, Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) orig-
inally use the term exclusively to refer to the organizational arrangements for managing the tensions from 
a hybrid strategy; that is, to refer to a feature of organizational architecture and an organizational ability 
rather than to a feature of corporate strategy. 6 
 
The strategy typologies described above and many other studies in different management re-
search areas explicitly or implicitly make the distinction between exploration and exploitation.2 
They largely agree on the organizational structures and HRM practices required for both strat-
egy types. Basically, an organic organizational architecture that relies on decentralization and 
coordination among functions as well as on HRM practices that focus on general skills and sub-
jective performance appraisals are best suited for exploration. In contrast, a mechanistic organ-
izational architecture that relies on centralization, standardization, and monitoring, as well as on 
HRM practices that focus on specific functional skills and objective performance appraisals, are 
best suited for exploitation.  
The original and most obvious solution to combine these contradictory organizational archi-
tectures  is  the  creation  of  separate  organizational  units  (that  is,  structural  ambidexterity). 
Hence, individuals in units with an organic architecture focus entirely on exploration, while in-
dividuals in units with a mechanistic architecture focus entirely on exploitation (Benner and 
Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; Miles and Snow, 1978; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).  
However, recent studies argue that dual structures are difficult to implement and that some 
firms fail at establishing sufficient linkages between exploratory and exploitative units, leading 
to the negligence of either exploration or exploitation. Further, it is argued that it is inefficient to 
let upper management decide on how to divide up the time of employees between exploration 
and exploitation. Also, it is argued that structural ambidexterity is better suited for larger firms, 
while smaller firms lack the slack resources and number of hierarchical levels to attain structur-
al ambidexterity (Birkinshaw, 2006; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004a; 2004b; 2005; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006).  
Individual ambidexterity 
Consequently, an approach other than structural ambidexterity has focused on how organic and 
mechanistic features can be combined within every organizational unit throughout the firm to 
                                                           
2 For example, organization theory (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Duncan, 1976; 
Holmqvist, 2004), strategy (Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa, 1993), technology and innovation management 
(Ambos et al., 2008; He and Wong, 2004), and HRM (Jackson, Schuler, and Rivero, 1989; Schuler and Jack-
son, 1987; Youndt et al., 1996). 7 
 
create a behavioral context that enables and encourages individuals to make their own judg-
ments about how to divide their time between exploratory and exploitative activities in the 
course of their day-to-day work (Adler and Borys, 1996; Adler et al., 1999; Birkinshaw, 2006; 
Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004a; 2004b; 2005; Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volderba, 2005b; She-
remata, 2000). What I call ‘individual ambidexterity’ ‘emerges from choices made by individuals, 
not from the strategic decisions made by senior executives’ (Birkinshaw, 2006). The literature 
suggests four critical factors to achieve individual ambidexterity, namely, decentralization and 
standardization, which are structural arrangements, and incentives and skills, which can be at-
tained through certain HRM practices. 
Decentralization,  that  is,  the  delegation  of  decision  authority  to  lower  hierarchical  levels, 
enables employees to switch between exploratory and exploitative activities in their sole discre-
tion. Employees can pursue their regular production work and at the same time stay alert for 
new opportunities, generate new ideas, and subsequently experiment with these ideas without 
seeking  permission  from  above.  Decentralization  allows  employees  to  directly  communicate 
with employees on the same hierarchical level but from other functions. This allows for an in-
terplay between a variety of perspectives as well as the development of a broad range of skills 
that are crucial for creativity. Thus, on the one hand, decentralization allows employees to divide 
up their time between exploration and exploitation in their sole discretion, but on the other 
hand, it clearly favors exploratory activities. In fact, decentralization may even be detrimental to 
exploitation. Through decentralization, employees may lose the discipline to efficiently pursue 
their work. They may invest too much time in imagination and trial and error (Adler et al., 1999; 
Benner and Tushman, 2003; Birkinshaw, 2006; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a; 2006; Raisch et al., 2009; Roberts, 2007; She-
remata, 2000; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). 
Thus, the ‘specification of clear limits beyond which the individual must no stray’ is required 
(Birkinshaw, 2006). Standardization, that is, the release of oral and written rules and proce-
dures, can guide the efficient execution of exploitative day-to-day activities (Adler and Borys, 
1996; Adler et al., 1999; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volderba, 8 
 
2006). In addition, standardization can increase the efficiency of exploratory activities without 
impairing creativity. First, standardization can be used to codify lessons of prior experience with 
the creation and implementation of exploratory innovations as well as to disseminate these best 
practices throughout the firm (Adler and Borys, 1996; Adler et al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005a; 
Roberts, 2007; Sheremata, 2000). Second, standardization can be used to increase the lateral 
knowledge exchange needed for creativity and at the same time reduce its costs (Jansen et al., 
2005a).  Thus,  standardization  enhances  the  efficient  pursuit  of  the  current  product  market 
agenda (exploitation) and also ensures the efficient pursuit of exploratory activities that are 
targeted at changing the product market agenda. 
A further mechanism to make sure that employees balance their exploratory and exploitative 
activities is to give them incentives for both types of activities through employee appraisal and 
performance-based pay (Birkinshaw, 2006; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004). Exploration requires collaboration among employees as well as the de-
velopment of a broad range of skills, which are hard to measure objectively. Thus, employee 
appraisal and performance-based pay should be based on subjective performance measures; 
that is, on behavior rather than results and on skill development. In contrast, exploitation focus-
es on efficiency improvement. Thus, individual performance contributions to exploitation can 
easily be attributed. Consequently, performance appraisal that incentivizes exploitation should 
be based on objective performance measures, that is, on quantitative results (Jackson et al., 
1989; Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Youndt et al., 1996). 
Finally, the importance of employee selection and training to enable employees to fulfill ex-
ploratory as well as exploitative tasks has been highlighted (Adler et al., 1999; Birkinshaw, 2006; 
Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). To foster explora-
tory skills, employee selection and training should lay stress on a broad range of skills, including 
problem-solving skills, skills that allow employees to understand the entire production process, 
and skills that are usable in a variety of positions in the firm. Finally, skills that foster the ex-
change of ideas throughout an organization should be advanced (Schuler and Jackson, 1987; 
Youndt et al., 1996). To foster exploitative skills, employee selection and training should focus 9 
 
on firm-, product-, and function-specific skills, the correction of skill deficiencies, and knowledge 
about  the  firm’s  rules  and  procedures  (Delery  and  Doty,  1996;  Schuler  and  Jackson,  1987; 
Youndt et al., 1996). 
Technological ambidexterity 
Like organizational structures and HRM practices, ICT can also support ambidexterity. 
ICT has been suggested as a means to support components of both organic and mechanistic 
organizational architectures (Dewett and Jones, 2001; George and King, 1991; Huber, 1990; Pin-
sonneault and Kraemer, 1997), that is, architectures supporting both exploration and exploita-
tion (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; Miles and Snow, 1978). Other studies show 
that ICT directly facilitates the exploratory and exploitative activities of individuals (Kane and 
Alavi, 2007; Mom, Van den Bosch, and Volderba, 2003). Further studies show that ICT may serve 
exploratory goals like product innovation and exploitative goals such as cost reduction (Aral and 
Weill, 2007; Oh and Pinsonneault, 2007). These studies also emphasize that ICT is not a homo-
genous technology but rather that different types of ICT support different organizational archi-
tectures, employee activities, and performance dimensions. Thus, I argue that different ICT types 
enable exploration (that is, exploratory ICT) and explotiation (that is, exploitative ICT) and that 
their combination supports ambidexterity. 
As groupware applications and corporate intranets facilitate the collaboration of employees, 
they are examples of exploratory ICT. Groupware applications offer functionalities such as e-
mail, instant text messaging, conferencing, document sharing and group scheduling (Ellis, Gibbs, 
and Rein, 1991; Grudin, 1994). Similarly, corporate intranets are private computing networks 
internal to an organization that are used to offer groupware applications (Curry and Stancich, 
2000; Ginsburg and Duliba, 1997). Thus, groupware applications (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; De-
wett and Jones, 2001; Ellis et al., 1991; Kane and Alavi, 2007) and corporate intranets (Bloom et 
al., 2009; Mom et al., 2003) enable employees to communicate with each other, share informa-
tion, and work together. As a consequence, groupware applications and corporate intranets faci-
litate decentralization and thus exploration. 10 
 
As enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications and workflow applications facilitate cen-
tralization, standardization, and results-based employee appraisal, they are examples of exploit-
ative ICT. Both ERP and workflow applications focus on the automation of business processes 
and data transfers across the organization (Cardoso, Bostrom, and Sheth, 2004). They integrate 
information across various functional departments and offer real-time metrics regarding orders, 
stocks, financials, and other firm characteristics. Hence, a full picture of what is currently hap-
pening in an organization and a clear view of the relative performance of different parts of the 
organization becomes available (Bloom et al., 2009; Cardoso et al., 2004; Chari, Devaraj, and 
David, 2008; Hendricks, Singhal, and Stratman, 2007; Hitt et al., 2002). Thus, under structural 
ambidexterity, ERP and workflow applications may foster centralization by giving faster, better, 
and more information to central decision makers (Bloom et al., 2009; Chari et al., 2008; Hen-
dricks et al., 2007; Stohr and Zhao, 2001). Further, ERP and workflow applications enhance cen-
tralization by allowing managers to better monitor the implementation of their decisions. Simi-
larly, under individual ambidexterity, ERP and workflow applications facilitate the monitoring of 
the implementation of rules and procedures and thus enhance standardization (Alavi and Leidn-
er, 2001; Grant and Higgins, 1991; Orlikowski and Robey, 1991). Further, as ‘performance mea-
surement becomes a matter of examining the system log’ (Stohr and Zhao, 2001: 291), ERP and 
workflow applications facilitate employee appraisal and performance-based pay that is using 
objective performance criteria. ERP and workflow applications thus foster exploitation under 
structural and individual ambidexterity. 
Hypotheses 
I presented the argument that the impact of hybrid strategies on firm performance is positively 
moderated by organizational ambidexterity. 
Hypothesis 1: Organizational ambidexterity positively moderates the impact of hybrid strategies 
on firm performance. 11 
 
I further noted that the performance advantages of hybrid strategies to different comparison 
groups can be studied. Figure 1 shows the five groups of firms that I distinguish according to the 
two dimensions of corporate strategy and organizational architecture.3  
----------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
----------------------------- 
Building on hypothesis 1, I suggest that the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy 
and organizational ambidexterity is higher than the average performance of the entire sample of 
firms in my study. In contrast, the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy but with-
out organizational ambidexterity is below the average performance of the entire sample of firms 
(average performance of groups 1 and 2 versus groups 1 to 5).  
Hypothesis 2a (2b): On average, in the presence (absence) of organizational ambidexterity, hybr-
id strategies outperform (underperform) the entire sample of firms.  
I further hypothesize that the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy and organiza-
tional ambidexterity is greater than the average performance of firms with a no-emphasis strat-
egy. In contrast, the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy but without organiza-
tional ambidexterity, matches the rather low average performance of the firms that lack a clear 
strategic emphasis (average performance of groups 1 and 2 versus group 5). 
Hypothesis 3a (3b): On average, in the presence (absence) of organizational ambidexterity, hy-
brid strategies outperform (match) no-emphasis strategies.  
Miles and Snow (1978) hypothesize that firms with hybrid strategies and organizational ambi-
dexterity perform as well as firms with pure strategies, while ambidexterity researchers hypo-
thesize that in the long-term firms with hybrid strategies and organizational ambidexterity even 
outperform firms with pure strategies (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Due to the composition of 
the sample used in this study, I advance the hypothesis that in the short-term, firms with a hybr-
                                                           
3 It makes sense to subclassify the group of firms with a pure strategy into firms with or without pure 
structures and HRM practices in order to allow for more subtle performance comparisons. It is intuitive to 
assume that firms with a pure strategy and high levels of pure structures and HRM practices might display 
a higher average performance than firms with a pure strategy but with low levels of pure structures and 
HRM practices.  12 
 
id strategy and with organizational ambidexterity match the average performance of firms with 
a pure strategy, while firms with a hybrid strategy but without organizational ambidexterity 
display a lower average performance than firms with a pure strategy (average performance of 
groups 1 and 2 versus groups 3 and 4). 
Hypothesis 4a (4b): On average, in the presence (absence) of organizational ambidexterity, hybr-
id strategies match (underperform) pure strategies.  
METHOD 
Models 
Moderation effects model 
Hypothesis 1 which pertains to the interaction effect of a hybrid strategy and organizational 
ambidexterity on firm performance, is tested by the moderation effects model 1: 
ROAit = β0 + β1 hybrid strategy i(t-1) + β2 organizational ambidexterity i(t-1)  
ROAit = + β3 (hybrid strategy i(t-1) × organizational ambidexterity i(t-1)) 
ROAit = + β4 environmental dynamism i(t-1) + β5 ROA i(t-1)  
ROAit = + β6-n [controls] i(t-1) + ε i(t-1)                                        (1) 
The dependent variable is the return on total assets (ROA) for firm i at time t. The independent 
variables are hybrid strategy, organizational ambidexterity, the interaction term of strategy and 
ambidexterity, environmental dynamism, and ROA. Further control variables are described be-
low. To account for repeated observations of the same firm, the error term ε is clustered by firm; 
it is Huber-White robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. All inde-
pendent variables are lagged one year; that is, they appear as at time t-1. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that β3 is significantly greater than zero, which indicates that the re-
gression of ROA on hybrid strategy depends on the level of organizational ambidexterity. 
I include lagged independent variables for theoretical and statistical reasons. First, choosing a 
strategy and an organizational architecture is linked to long-term investments that might re-
quire a certain time period to affect firm performance. Second, instrumenting independent va-
riables by their lagged values mitigates the potential for simultaneity, that is, the possibility that 
performance and strategy or architecture are jointly determined (Spanos et al., 2004).  13 
 
I include environmental dynamism as a control variable, since prior studies have shown that 
it can affect both a firm’s necessity to pursue a hybrid strategy and a firm’s success in doing so 
(Auh and Mengue, 2005; Jansen et al., 2005a; 2006; Raisch and Hotz, 2010). 
Consistent with many prior studies on performance, I include the lagged value of the depen-
dent variable as a control to account for any unobserved firm heterogeneity that causes differ-
ences in the dependent variable and that is not captured by other controls (Burton, Lauridsen, 
and Obel, 2002; Spanos et al., 2004; Thornhill and White, 2007; Uotila et al., 2009).  
Effects-coding model 
Hypothesis 2 concerns the performance difference between the group of firms with a hybrid 
strategy and with (or without) organizational ambidexterity as opposed to the entire sample of 
firms. An effects-coding model is suitable to test this hypothesis, as in an effects-coding model, 
the coefficient of the indicator variable for a particular group indicates the difference between 
the mean performance of this group and the mean of the mean performances of all groups, in-
cluding the respective group (Hardy, 1993; Spanos et al., 2004).4  
The effects-coding model 2 includes indicator variables for firms with a hybrid strategy and 
organizational ambidexterity, for firms with a hybrid strategy but without organizational ambi-
dexterity, for firms with a pure strategy and a pure organizational architecture, and for firms 
with a pure strategy but without a pure organizational architecture. Firms with a no-emphasis 
strategy serve as the reference group.  
ROAit = β0 + β1 hybrid strategy with organizational ambidexterity i(t-1)  
ROAit =+ β2 hybrid strategy without organizational ambidexterity i(t-1)  
ROAit =+ β3 pure strategy with pure organizational architecture i(t-1)  
ROAit =+ β4 pure strategy without pure organizational architecture i(t-1) 
ROAit =+ β5 environmental dynamism i(t-1) + β6 ROA i(t-1)  
ROAit =+ β7-n [controls] i(t-1) + ε i(t-1)                                                 (2) 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that β1 is significantly greater than zero, which indicates that the average 
performance of firms with a hybrid strategy and organizational ambidexterity lies above the 
                                                           
4 Although the mean of the means of all groups does not equal the overall mean of the sample if there are 
unequal numbers of observations in each group, the regression coefficient of a particular group can still be 
interpreted ‘as a measure of the ‘eccentricity’ or the ‘uniqueness’ of the specified group in comparison to 
an ‘average’ value for the entire sample’ (Spanos et al., 2004: 153). 14 
 
average performance of the entire sample. Hypothesis 2b predicts that β2 is significantly smaller 
than zero, indicating that the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy but without 
organizational ambidexterity lies below the average performance of the entire sample. 
Dummy-coding models 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 concern the performance differences between the group of firms with a hy-
brid strategy and with (or without) organizational ambidexterity as opposed to two different 
comparison groups. Dummy-coding models are suitable to test these hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3 concerns the performance difference between the group of firms with a hybrid 
strategy and with (or without) organizational ambidexterity as opposed to the group of firms 
with a no-emphasis strategy. Thus, the dummy-coding model 3 includes indicator variables for 
all groups of firms, except for firms with a no-emphasis strategy. Apart from the coding of the 
indicator variables, model 3 is equal to model 2.  
Hypothesis 3a (3b) predicts that β1 (β2) in model 3 is significantly greater than zero (not sig-
nificantly different from zero), which indicates that the average performance of firms with a 
hybrid strategy and with (without) organizational ambidexterity lies above (is equal to) the av-
erage performance of firms with a no-emphasis strategy.  
Hypothesis 4 concerns the performance difference between the group of firms with a hybrid 
strategy and with (or without) organizational ambidexterity as opposed to the group of firms 
with a pure strategy. Dummy-coding model 4 includes indicator variables for all groups of firms, 
except for the firms with a pure strategy and a pure organizational architecture. The dummy-
coding model 5 includes indicator variables for all groups of firms, except for the firms with a 
pure strategy but without a pure organizational architecture. Apart from the coding of the indi-
cator variables and the reference groups, models 4 and 5 are equal to model 2. 
Hypothesis 4a (4b) predicts that β1 (β2) in models 4 and 5 is not significantly different from 
zero (significantly smaller than zero), which indicates that the average performance of firms 
with a hybrid strategy and (without) organizational ambidexterity is equal to (lies below) the 
average performance of firms with a pure strategy.  15 
 
Sample 
I employ a novel multi-source panel dataset on corporate strategy, organizational structure, 
HRM practices, ICT, and firm performance of 784 German and Polish manufacturing firms. To 
avoid single-source bias, I construct the dataset from three independent sources: (1) a panel of 
the ICT types used in firms over the period 2005-2008, (2) a panel of firm performance informa-
tion over the period 2005-2008, and (2) a 2008 cross-section of corporate strategy, organiza-
tional structure, HRM practices, ICT use, and other firm characteristics. 
I obtained information on the ICT types employed by firms from Harte-Hanks’ CI Technology 
Database (CITDB) which provides annual information on specific hardware and software types 
that are used by the establishments of more than 10,000 German and 1,800 Polish firms. Harte-
Hanks states that the firms in the CITDB are largely representative of the entire populations of 
German and Polish firms. 
I derived firm performance information from Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS database, which pro-
vides balance sheets and profit and loss statements based on annual company reports.  
All German and Polish firms that maintain at least one manufacturing establishment and that 
are covered by both the CITDB and ORBIS formed the pool of 2,369 potential respondents to a 
telephone survey on corporate strategy, organizational structure, HRM practices, ICT use, and 
other firm characteristics that was conducted in August and September 2008. Nine student re-
search analysts contacted 1,788 firms5 and interviewed 784 production managers (or similar 
managers), representing a response rate of 43.8 percent. The firms of the responding production 
managers do not significantly differ from the non-responding firms in terms of firm performance 
(that is, return on total assets), but they are slightly larger.6  
I chose manufacturing firms in order to concentrate on one questionnaire and thus avoid any 
bias from differences between corporate strategies, organizational structures, HRM practices, 
and other firm characteristics that are required for the generation of products versus services. 
                                                           
5 The remaining 581 firms were not contacted either because they did not exist anymore, they had no 
manufacturing establishments in Germany or Poland, no telephone number could be identified, or the 
interviewers were not able to get in touch with the firms before the end of the project. 
6 This is based on a logistic regression with a binary dependent variable that indicates response.  16 
 
German and Polish firms were chosen for a practical reason, namely, the availability of native 
speakers as interviewers. I chose production managers as potential respondents because they 
are typically in upper middle management and thus are able to deliver insights into corporate 
strategy as well as organizational structure and HRM practices. Further, through the narrow set 
of informants, single-informant bias was held relatively constant. The surveyed establishments 
employed  on  average  68.5  percent  of  a  firm’s  total  employees,  indicating  that  the  obtained 
measures are largely representative of the firms.  
Most of the survey items were derived and adapted from prior studies, as described below. 
The survey instrument was discussed at length with one production manager and then pretested 
in interviews with 15 additional production managers. The pretest led to slight adaptations in 
the survey instrument. The questionnaires for Polish production managers were translated from 
German into Polish by an accredited translator and then checked by two Polish managers and 
two Polish research analysts.  
Corporate strategy is available from the 2008 cross-section, which is matched with two time-
series datasets that cover the period from 2005 to 2008. As corporate strategy is the key com-
ponent of this study, two measures are undertaken to avoid any bias from strategy changes be-
tween 2005 and 2008. First, respondents were asked to indicate the firm’s realized strategy dur-
ing  the  last  three  years  rather  than  the  intended  strategy  which  is  often  not  fully  realized 
(Mintzberg, 1978). Second, respondents were asked for strategy changes in the last three years. 
If a respondent indicated that the corporate strategy had strongly or very strongly changed dur-
ing this period, all observations of this firm are excluded from the analysis. 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 are tested with regard to individual and technological ambidexterity. I 
created two separate samples for individual and technological ambidexterity to reduce the loss 
of observations due to missing values to an acceptable level. A sample of 258 (302) firms, with 
each firm represented by at least one of 457 (502) observations, is available for the analysis of 
individual (technological) ambidexterity. The firms in both samples do not significantly differ 
from all other German and Polish manufacturing firms included in the CITDB and ORBIS with 17 
 
regard to firm performance, but they are slightly smaller.7 The firms in the individual (technolo-
gical) ambidexterity sample have on average 423 (406) employees. 
Measures 
Firm performance  
I measure firm performance as the return on total assets (ROA), which is one of the most widely-
used firm performance measures in analyses of corporate strategy and organizational architec-
ture (Burton et al., 2002). I obtain ROA from ORBIS and calculate it as (profit or loss before taxa-
tion / total assets) × 100.  
Corporate strategy 
Measures for the extents to which an exploration strategy and an exploitation strategy are pur-
sued are obtained from my survey on production managers. Respondents were asked to indicate 
on a Likert scale from 1 (‘I do not agree at all’) to 5 (‘I strongly agree’) if several items have been 
a key part of the respective firm’s strategy during the last three years. I derived and adapted all 
items from prior surveys on strategy typologies or ambidexterity (Dess and Davis, 1984; Doty, 
Glick, and Huber, 1993; He and Wong, 2004; Kotha and Vadlamani, 1995; Lubatkin et al., 2006; 
Miller and Toulouse, 1998; Segev, 1989). The items that measure exploration focus on the explo-
ration of new and unique product market domains, while the items that measure exploitation 
focus on efficiency and improvement in existing product market domains. The exploratory and 
exploitative items load on different factors in a joint exploratory factor analysis with varimax 
rotation. Factor loadings are above .53 with cross-loading below .34. Thus, I use the average of 
the exploratory items to create a measure of exploration. Further, I use the average of the ex-
ploitative items to create a measure of exploitation. Cronbach’s alpha for both measures is .76 
and thus above the cut-off point of .70 (Nunally, 1978).  
                                                           
7 This is based on a logistic regression with a binary dependent variable indicating sample inclusion and 
notably unproblematic, however, as I am especially interested in the moderating role of individual ambi-
dexterity, which is seen as the appropriate form of organizational ambidexterity for smaller firms (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). 18 
 
Measures for a hybrid strategy have been constructed by multiplying (Gibson and Birkin-
shaw, 2004; Venkatraman et al., 2007), dividing (Uotila et al., 2009), subtracting (He and Wong, 
2004; Cao et al., 2009), and adding (Jansen et al., 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2006) measures for ex-
ploration and exploitation. Interacting exploration and exploitation incorporates the assumption 
that both are complementary, that is, mutually reinforcing. In contrast, consistent with the out-
lined strategy typologies, I believe that exploration and exploitation are fundamentally different 
activities that even require separate or complex organizational arrangements in order to be 
combined within one firm. Dividing and subtracting exploration and exploitation is based on the 
idea that emphasizing either exploration or exploitation is only possible at the expense of the 
other. Though this perspective is valid, achieving a balance between exploration and exploita-
tion is fine-tuning. In the first instance, a hybrid strategy requires that both exploration and ex-
ploitation are pursued to a sufficiently high degree. I interpret exploration and exploitation as 
orthogonal activities (Gupta et al., 2006). A firm can engage in high levels of both activities at the 
same time, provided that suitable organizational arrangements are in place. Further, two studies 
have shown that an additive approach has had greater explanatory power than the other pers-
pectives (Jansen et al., 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2006). Consequently, to test hypothesis 1, I choose 
the additive model and measure hybrid strategy as the average of exploration and exploitation.8 
Individual ambidexterity 
Measures for individual ambidexterity are obtained from my survey on production managers. 
Decentralization is measured as the average of the degree of decentralization of various or-
ganizational decision rights, ranging from lower-level decisions such as the pace of the work of 
production workers to higher-level decisions such as product pricing (α=.88). I derived and 
adapted all items from several prior studies on decentralization (Andersen and Jonsson, 2006; 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2009a; Burton et al., 2002; Colombo, Delmastro, and Rabbiosi, 
2007; Hanks et al., 1993; Lee and Grover, 2000; Nahm, Vonderembse, and Koufteros, 2003; 
Pugh, 1973). For each decision right, the respondents were asked to indicate the hierarchical 
                                                           
8 I employ two robustness tests to mitigate the potential of bias from the additive model, as described 
below. 19 
 
level that is responsible for the decision. As many firms have different numbers of hierarchical 
levels, the respondents were asked to indicate the total number of hierarchical levels in their 
firm. Subsequently, every item was standardized so that 0 means that the decision is made at the 
highest hierarchical level of the firm (that is, fully centralized) and 1 means that the decision is 
made at the lowest hierarchical level of the firm (that is, fully decentralized).  
Standardization is measured as the average of two five-point Likert scale items that are de-
rived and adapted from prior studies (α=.56) (Andersen and Jonsson, 2006; Burton et al., 2002; 
Hanks et al., 1993; Nahm et al., 2003). Respondents were asked to indicate how many written or 
oral rules and procedures are in place in their firm.  
Employee appraisal, screening, and training are measured by an innovative interview method 
that is adapted from Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen (forthcoming). The method incorpo-
rates open questions and open answers, which are then transformed into numeric values from 1 
to 5 by the interviewer. This method allows for much more detailed insights into HRM practices 
than is possible with rather short Likert scale items. Further, as respondents do not choose 
from a predefined set of answers, the method mitigates the problem of social desirability 
which is important in the context of HRM practices.9 For example, some respondents might 
give unrealistically optimistic answers to questions about the amount or contents of employee 
training if they feel that these HRM practices are generally considered ‘good.’ The interviewers 
were provided with prepared questions; they began with general questions and continued with 
more specific questions based on the prior answers of respondents. The interviewers were also 
encouraged to deviate from the prepared questions if needed. Thus, a conversation led by the 
interviewer took place regarding every HRM practice. The dialog was not ended until the inter-
viewer felt that she or he had a full picture of the HRM practice in question and was able to de-
cide on a numeric score. In particular, the interviewers were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 
(‘not important at all’) to 5 (‘very important’) the importance of both the exploratory and the 
                                                           
9 The Human Subjects Committee of Stanford University approved this methodology for the study of Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007), because the respondents’ unawareness of being scored is necessary to reduce the problem of social 
desirability, not risky for the respondents and their employers due to data confidentiality, and temporary as the res-
pondents are debriefed after the end of the project. 20 
 
exploitative components with respect to employee appraisal, screening, and training. Thus, six 
measures were generated, namely, three regarding the importance of exploratory components 
in employee appraisal, screening, and training and three regarding the importance of exploita-
tive components  in  employee  appraisal,  screening,  and  training. The  survey  instruments  for 
HRM practices were developed specifically for this study but nevertheless share broad similari-
ties with prior studies on HRM practices that are appropriate for different corporate strategies 
(Jackson et al., 1989; Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Youndt et al., 1996). To test the inter-rater re-
liability of this survey method, a second interviewer listened to 31.3 percent of all production 
manager interviews (that is, 245 interviews) and assigned scores to the respondent answers 
independently from the first interviewer. The correlation coefficients of the first interviewer and 
the second interviewer scorings for the six HRM variables created using this interview method 
range from 0.6292 to 0.8088 and were highly significant. This result implies that the survey me-
thod leads to relatively homogenous results, even if different interviewers score the same inter-
view. I use the average of the decentralization measure and the three measures for the explora-
tory components of HRM practices to create a measure for exploratory structures and HRM 
practices. I use the average of the standardization measure and the three measures for the ex-
ploitative components of HRM practices to create a measure for exploitative structures and HRM 
practices. Finally, I compute individual ambidexterity as (exploratory structures and HRM prac-
tices + exploitative structures and HRM practices) / 2.  
Alpha reliabilities for the decentralization and standardization measures are provided above. 
Tests for the internal consistency of the measures for exploratory and exploitative structures 
and HRM practices and individual ambidexterity are not appropriate, as these measures are de-
signed to capture different aspects of a construct rather than multiple measures of a construct. 
Thus, there are no specific expectations about the intercorrelations between the aspects; they 
might correlate positively, negatively, or not at all (Aral and Weill, 2007, Diamantopoulus, Rief-
ler, and Roth, 2008, Jarvis, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff, 2003). 21 
 
Technological ambidexterity 
All measures for technological ambidexterity are obtained from the CITDB. The CITDB provides 
binary variables that indicate if specific hardware and software products are used in the ob-
served establishments. For example, the CITDB would indicate if Exchange Server from Micro-
soft or Lotus Domino from IBM are in place in an establishment. Harte-Hanks groups these 
products into broader classes of hardware and software products. For example, Exchange Server 
and Lotus Domino, which are both collaboration software products, would be assigned to the 
groupware class. I use these groupings to obtain measures for the four ICT types that are out-
lined above (see Table 1).10  
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 
----------------------------- 
For example, I create a corporate intranet dummy that is coded 1 if any frame-relay, leased-line, 
or wide-area network is in place in an establishment, as these hardware types are typically em-
ployed for intranets (Bloom et al., 2009). Subsequently, the average of the corporate intranet 
and groupware dummies is used to create an exploratory ICT variable. The average of the ERP 
and workflow application dummies is used to create an exploitative ICT variable.  
Group indicator variables 
To create effects-coded and dummy-coded group indicator variables, I assign all firms in both 
samples to one group; I employ the two dimensions of corporate strategy and organizational 
architecture to differentiate between the groups. Consistent with other studies, I use the me-
dian-cutoff criterion to assign the firms to groups (He and Wong, 2004).11 
                                                           
10 As all information in the CITDB pertains to the establishment-level, I aggregate the four dummies to the 
firm-level. For example, if any of the observed establishments of a firm possesses a groupware application, 
the firm-level groupware dummy is coded 1. Note that the establishments surveyed by Harte-Hanks em-
ployed on average 85.6 (85.2) percent of a firm’s total employees in the individual (technological) ambi-
dexterity sample, indicating that the obtained measures are largely representative of the firms.  
11 In the individual ambidexterity sample, I assign a firm to the group of firms with a hybrid strategy and 
organizational ambidexterity if (1) the firm’s value for the exploration measure is equal to or greater than 
the median of the exploration measure; (2) the firm’s value for the exploitation measure is equal to or 
greater than the median of the exploitation measure; (3) the firm’s value for the measure for exploratory 
structures and HRM practices is equal to or greater than the median of this measure; and (4) the firm’s 
value for the measure for exploitative structures and HRM practices is equal to or greater than the median 22 
 
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 
----------------------------- 
Control variables 
The measure for environmental dynamism is obtained from my survey on production managers 
and constructed in the style of two prior studies (Daft, Sormunen, and Parks., 1988; May, Ste-
wart, and Sweo, 2000). Respondents were asked to indicate on scales from 1 to 5 the rate of 
change, predictability, and importance of seven areas of the environment (market, competitors, 
technology, labor market, capital market, legislators/regulators, and the socio-cultural environ-
ment). I then calculated the dynamism in each of the seven environmental areas as (rate of 
change + predictability) × importance and used the average of the seven resulting dynamism 
variables to create a measure of the overall environmental dynamism (α=.74).12 
Firm-level control variables are firm size, measured as total number of employees, and firm 
age, measured as years in operation. Both measures have been associated with inertia and sev-
eral other effects that may impact firm performance, corporate strategy, or organizational archi-
tecture (He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Spanos et al., 2004). The measures are ob-
tained from ORBIS and log-normalized to compensate for skewness. Further, a dummy variable 
to account for the firm’s nationality is included in all analyses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of this measure. In contrast, a firm is assigned to the group of firms with a hybrid strategy but without 
organizational architecture if (1) and (2) apply but if either (3) or (4) or both do not apply. I assign a firm 
to the group of firms with a pure strategy and a pure organizational architecture if (1) the firm’s value for 
the exploration (or exploitation) measure is equal to or greater than the median of this measure; (2) the 
firm’s value for the exploitation (or exploration) measure is below the median of this measure; and (3) the 
firm’s value for the measure for exploratory (or exploitative) structures and HRM practices is equal to or 
greater than the median of this measure. In contrast, a firm is assigned to the group of firms with a pure 
strategy but without a pure organizational architecture if (1) and (2) apply but (3) does not. 
I assign a firm to the group of firms with a no-emphasis strategy if the firm’s values for both the explora-
tion measure and the exploitation measure are below the medians of the respective measures. The group 
assignments in the technological ambidexterity sample are made analogously, as shown in Table 2.  
12 A dummy variable to account for data limitations is included in all regressions. If the measure for envi-
ronmental dynamism is not available for a firm due to missing values, the environmental dynamism vari-
able is coded 0, while the environmental dynamism missing dummy is coded 1 (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007; Uotila et al., 2009). The environmental dynamism variable is missing for 27 observations in the 
individual ambidexterity sample (5.9 percent of observations) and for 47 observations in the technologi-
cal ambidexterity sample (9.0 percent of the observations). 23 
 
I use additional dummy variables to account for industry effects. Particularly, I control for the 
firm’s core industry membership at the one-digit SIC code level13 and for the firm’s manufactur-
ing sector membership at the two-digit SIC code level.  
Finally, year dummies are included to control for time effects. 
Descriptive statistics for both samples are provided in Table 3 and Table 4.  
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 
----------------------------- 
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 
----------------------------- 
RESULTS 
Moderation effects models 
To mitigate the potential for multicollinearity when testing the moderation effects model 1, I 
mean centered the linear terms of hybrid strategy and organizational ambidexterity before ob-
taining their product (Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). Multicollinearity con-
cerns are further diminished because the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all regressions for 
individual (technological) ambidexterity are never above 3.44 (4.34 and thus below the cut-off 
value of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, and West, 2002). 
The ordinary least square (OLS) regression results for individual ambidexterity are reported 
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. The results in column (1) show that a hybrid strategy does not 
significantly affect performance if the hybrid strategy variable enters the regression in isolation. 
However, the interaction term of hybrid strategy and individual ambidexterity in column (2) is 
positive and significant. This supports hypothesis 1 that the effect of hybrid strategies on per-
formance is positively moderated by organizational ambidexterity. Note that now also the over-
                                                           
13 As my survey focused on manufacturing firms, manufacturing (one-digit SIC codes 2 and 3) is the core 
industry for most observations in both samples (80.7 percent of the observations in the individual ambi-
dexterity sample and 81.5 percent of the observations in the technological ambidexterity sample).  24 
 
all marginal effect of a hybrid strategy on firm performance is positive. The results for technolo-
gical ambidexterity in columns (3) and (4) confirm this finding.14  
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 
----------------------------- 
Effects- and dummy-coding models 
Hypotheses 2 to 4 are tested with effects- and dummy-coding models 2, 3, 4, and 5. The model 
and the reference group employed in every column are indicated at the top of Table 6.15  
----------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 
----------------------------- 
Column (1) shows the results for effects-coding model 2. As shown, the average performance of 
the group of firms with a hybrid strategy and individual ambidexterity is significantly higher 
than the sample average performance, that is, the average of the average performances of all 
groups of firms (2.9001**). Instead, the average performance of firms with a hybrid strategy but 
without individual ambidexterity is significantly lower than the sample average performance (-
                                                           
14 Note that I employ two robustness tests for hypothesis 1 with alternative measures of hybrid strategy, 
individual ambidexterity, and technological ambidexterity. Obviously, if computing the hybrid strategy 
measure as the average of exploration and exploitation, a firm with an exploration score of 5 and an ex-
ploitation score of 1 and another firm with an exploration score of 3 and an exploitation score of 3 are 
assigned the same hybrid strategy score, namely 3. However, one could argue that the former firm is a 
pure explorer and only the latter firm pursues an actual hybrid strategy. The analogous reasoning applies 
to the individual ambidexterity and technological ambidexterity measures. First, to mitigate bias from this 
and ensure that only firms with an actual hybrid strategy, ambidextrous organizational architecture, and 
ambidextrous ICT are considered in the analysis, I recode the measures to 0 if at least one of their respec-
tive two components is below its median value. The results presented in Table 5 hold for both individual 
and  technological  ambidexterity  (not  reported).  Second,  using  a  dummy-coding  model,  as  described 
above, I employ subgroup analysis as an alternative means to test hypothesis 1; that is, I compare the av-
erage performance of firms with a hybrid strategy and organizational ambidexterity with the average 
performance of firms with a hybrid strategy but without organizational ambidexterity. As outlined above, 
the group indicator variables for the dummy-coding models are created by the median-cutoff criterion, 
meaning that only firms with an actual hybrid strategy are coded as such a firm. The results support hypo-
thesis 1 for individual and technological ambidexterity, are shown in Table 6, and described in more detail 
below. 
15 Note that dummy- and effects-coding are alternative methods but mathematically equivalent (Hardy, 
1993; Spanos et al., 2004). As the same data are used in columns (1) to (5), they yield an identical R² and 
identical coefficients for all variables except for the group indicator variables. This also applies to columns 
(6) to (10). 25 
 
1.8968**). These results hold for technological ambidexterity, as shown in column (6). Thus, 
hypothesis 2 is supported for individual and technological ambidexterity.16  
Column (3) shows dummy-coding model 3.The coefficient for the group of firms with a hybr-
id strategy and individual ambidexterity is positive and significant (5.6936***), indicating that 
these firms outperform firms with a no-emphasis strategy on average. In contrast, the coefficient 
for the group of firms with a hybrid strategy but without individual ambidexterity is insignifi-
cant, indicating that on average, there are no significant performance differences to the firms 
with a no-emphasis strategy (0.8967). These results hold for technological ambidexterity, as 
shown in column (8). Thus, hypothesis 3 is supported.  
Columns (4) and (5) show models 4 and 5. As outlined above, the group of firms with a pure 
strategy is split into firms with or without pure structures and HRM practices. Column (4) uses 
firms with a pure strategy and pure structures and HRM practices as the reference group. As 
shown, firms with a hybrid strategy and individual ambidexterity do not display a significantly 
different average performance than the reference group (2.4523). However, firms with a hybrid 
strategy but without individual ambidexterity have a significantly lower average performance 
than firms with a pure strategy and pure structures and HRM practices (-2.3447*). These find-
ings hold if firms with a pure strategy but without pure structures and HRM practices are used 
as the reference group in column (5). Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported for individual ambidexter-
ity.  
In columns (9) and (10), hypothesis 4a is fully supported for technological ambidexterity. In 
contrast, hypothesis 4b is only supported in column (9). In column (10), the average perfor-
mance differences between firms with a hybrid strategy and without technological ambidexteri-
ty as opposed to firms with a pure strategy and without pure ICT are insignificant. Given the 
                                                           
16 Column (2) employs dummy-coding and uses firms with a hybrid strategy and without organizational 
ambidexterity as the reference group. Although not formally hypothesized, column (2) gives further sup-
port  for  hypothesis  1  on  the  moderating  effect  of  organizational  architecture  in  the  hybrid  strategy-
performance relationship. In fact, the subgroup analysis employed in column (2) is an alternative to the 
moderation effects model 1 in Table 5 for testing the moderation approach (Venkatraman, 1989). Accord-
ing to column (2), firms with a hybrid strategy and individual ambidexterity have a significantly higher 
average performance than firms with a hybrid strategy but without individual ambidexterity (4.7970***). 
Thus, hypothesis 1 is again fully supported for individual ambidexterity. The finding holds for technologi-
cal ambidexterity in column (7). 26 
 
abovementioned assumption that firms with a pure strategy but without pure ICT may, on aver-
age, underperform firms with a pure strategy and pure ICT, this finding is not surprising. How-
ever, hypothesis 4b is only partly supported for technological ambidexterity.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
I  examined  the  role  of  organizational  architecture  as  a  moderator  of  the  hybrid  strategy-
performance relationship. Particularly, I focused on the roles of individual and technological 
ambidexterity in relatively small firms. Further, I examined the performance impact of hybrid 
strategies as compared to different reference groups. I employed a novel dataset from three in-
dependent sources and with objective performance data from annual firm accounts and found 
evidence that both individual and technological ambidexterity positively moderate the hybrid 
strategy-performance relationship. Further, I found hybrid strategies to outperform the entire 
sample and no-emphasis strategies in the presence of organizational ambidexterity, but to un-
derperform the entire sample and match the performance of firms with no-emphasis strategies 
in the absence of organizational ambidexterity. Finally, I found hybrid strategies to match the 
performance of pure strategies in the presence of organizational ambidexterity but to underper-
form them in absence of organizational ambidexterity. These findings raise important issues for 
both theory and practice.  
Implications for research 
First and foremost, this study provides a conceptual advancement. To the best of my knowledge, 
this study is the first large-sample empirical analysis of the role of organizational architecture as 
a moderator of the hybrid strategy-performance relationship. Thus, this study is a first step to 
closing a gap between theoretical and empirical research on the performance impact of hybrid 
strategies. Particularly, the finding that the presence of an ambidextrous organizational architec-
ture does not only change the strength but also the direction of a hybrid strategy’s performance 
effect might offer an explanation for the fact that both positive and negative performance effects 
of hybrid strategies have been found in prior studies which disregarded organizational architec-
ture. Second, to my knowledge, this study provides the first analysis of the potential of ICT to 27 
 
achieve organizational ambidexterity. Third, this study provides a methodological advancement 
by employing a variety of performance definitions. Fourth, this study is the first example to 
show that it can be fruitful to combine the largely disconnected theoretical and empirical re-
search on classic typologies of corporate strategy as well as on ambidexterity. Finally, in addition 
to the theoretical and empirical advancements of this study, there is also a contribution with 
respect to the data-gathering methods used.  
Implications for managers 
With regard to managerial implications, this study draws a more differentiated picture of the 
performance effects of hybrid strategies than prior studies. First, for managers that pursue the 
exploratory as well as the exploitative success of their firms, this study confirms that hybrid 
strategies can indeed positively affect firm performance if suitable organizational arrangements 
are in place. Second, these organizational arrangements are less difficult to establish than prior 
studies have argued. Instead, a sophisticated combination of well-known and well-understood 
organizational structures and HRM practices is sufficient to provide organizational ambidexteri-
ty. Third, managers in relatively small firms should especially consider individual ambidexterity 
as the appropriate organizational solution for hybrid strategies. Fourth, managers should also 
draw their attention to the potential of ICT to achieve ambidexterity. 
Limitations and future research 
Of course, this study is not without limitations. Although the dataset is a major strength of this 
study and though several measures were undertaken to avoid any bias, I had to combine cross-
sectional data with time-series data. Future studies could employ actual time-series data on cor-
porate strategy and organizational architecture. Further, to make firms within the study compa-
rable and in order to focus on one questionnaire, my survey focused on manufacturing firms. To 
be able to conduct telephone interviews, my survey was limited to German and Polish firms. 
Finally, to fruitfully analyze the role of individual ambidexterity, I chose relatively small firms as 
subjects of the study. In sum, future studies could verify if the findings of this study are genera-
lizable to other industries, other countries, and larger firms. Further, although the dataset al-28 
 
lowed the assessment of objective performance data with a one-year lag, future studies should 
analyze the long-term performance impacts of hybrid strategies (3, 5, or 10 years). Particularly, 
it would be interesting to see if hybrid strategies outperform pure strategies in the long term. 
Also, it would be interesting to compare the performance variation within the groups of firms 
with a hybrid strategy and with (or without) organizational ambidexterity to the performance 
variation within other groups of firms at a certain point in time (He and Wong, 2004) or over 
time (Levinthal and March, 1993). It would also be interesting to test if the moderating effect of 
organizational ambidexterity can be verified for structural, leadership-based, and informal am-
bidexterity. In addition, the potential of ICT to enhance organizational ambidexterity should be 
analyzed in more detail. Specifically, it would be interesting to examine whether ICT is particu-
larly fruitful for enhancing specific types of organizational ambidexterity, or if it even enables 
new forms of organizational ambidexterity. In conclusion, I view this study as a promising step 
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Figure 1. Five groups of firms split by corporate strategy and organizational architecture 
Table 1. Summary of empirical studies 
Findings on hybrid strategies  Studies 
Studies on Porter's strategy typology   
only pure strategies are related to above-average firm performance  Dess and Davis, 1984; Hall, 1980 
pure strategies outperform hybrid strategies, and that hybrid strat-
egies only perform as well as no-emphasis strategies  Miller and Friesen, 1986 
pure strategies do not always outperform hybrid strategies  Milles and Dess, 1993 
hybrid strategies can also lead to above-average firm performance 
or even outperform no-emphasis strategies 
Miller, 1992; Spanos et al., 2004; 
White, 1986 
hybrid strategies outperform one or both types of pure strategies  Spanos et al., 2004; White, 1986 
Studies on Miles and Snow’s strategy typology 
positive performance effect for prospector, defender, and analyzer 
strategies but a negative effect for no-emphasis strategies  Moore, 2005 
prospectors, defenders, and analyzers perform equally well and 
outperform no-emphasis strategies 
Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan, 
1990 
analyzers can outperform prospectors and defenders in certain 
contexts 
Hambrick, 1983a; Parnell and 
Wright, 1993 
Studies on Miles and Snow’s strategy typology   
hybrid strategies have a positive impact on firm performance 
Cao et al., 2009; Gibson and Birkin-
shaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004; 
Lubatkin et al., 2006; Uotila et al., 
hybrid strategies do not significantly affect firm performance  Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; 
Venkatraman, Lee, and Iyer, 2007 
Studies on similar strategy typologies, derived from the three typologies above 
the firms in high profit clusters pursue pure strategies  Hambrick, 1983b 
that the degree of strategic purity positively impacts firm perfor-
mance  Thornhill and White, 2007 
hybrid strategies positively correlate with firm performance in 
some cases  Parnell and Hershey, 2005 
hybrid strategies lead to above-average firm performance in gener-
al, or may even outperform no-emphasis and pure strategies 
Parnell, 1997; Parnell, Lester, and 
Menefee, 2000 37 
 
Table 2. ICT types  
Exploratory ICT   
    Groupware applications  Collaboration software (e-mail, shared calendars, 
shared document storage and management, etc.)  
Office automation software 
Other groupware software 
    Corporate intranets  Frame-relay 
Leased-line 
Wide-area network  
   
Exploitative ICT   
    ERP applications  Accounting software 
Human resource management software 
Supply chain management software 
Customer relationship management software 
Other ERP software 
    Workflow applications   Application server software 
Content management software 
Document management software 
Enterprise application integration software 
Portal management software 
   
 
 
Table 3. Groups in the individual and technological ambidexterity samples 
Groups in ind. ambid. sample   Firms  Obs.    Groups in techn. ambid. sample   Firms  Obs. 
             
Hybrid strategy  27  45    Hybrid strategy  53  90 
and individual ambidexterity        and technological ambid.     
             
Hybrid strategy  64  109    Hybrid strategy  57  87 
w/o individual ambidexterity        w/o technological ambid.     
             
Pure strategy  62  113    Pure strategy  91  166 
and pure structures/HRM        and pure ICT     
             
Pure strategy  49  86    Pure strategy  37  55 
w/o pure structures/HRM        w/o pure ICT     
             
No-emphasis strategy  56  104    No-emphasis strategy  68  122 
             
Total  258  457    Total  306  520 
Note that a total of 306 firms for the technological ambidexterity sample (> 302 as stated in regressions) 
results from firms that have changed groups over time through changes in their ICT adoption 38 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the individual ambidexterity sample 
Variable  Firms  Obs.  Median  Mean  Std. dev 
. 
Min  Max 
               
ROA (t)  258  457  8.9585  10.0292  14.2045  -33.3887  136.0431 
               
ROA   258  457  7.9589  9.4653  13.3181  -33.7865  87.8834 
               
Firm size (ln)  
 
258  457  5.5134  5.5852  0.9428  1.3863  8.2721 
               
Firm age (ln)   258  457  3.2958  3.2403  0.9473  0  5.2149 
               
Environmental dyn.   258  457  23.5000  22.4032  7.3501  0  39.6250 
               
Hybrid strategy (mc)   258  457  -0.0209  0  0.5170  -1.8334  1.2708 
               
Ind. ambid. (mc)   258  457  0.0532  0  0.4527  -1.6933  1.1426 
               
Hybrid strategy (mc)  258  457  0.0106  0.0367  0.2514  -0.6263  1.5418 
× ind. ambid. (mc)                
               
Firm size (ut)   258  457  248  423.1745  504.0048  4  3,913 
               
Firm age (ut)   258  457  26  37.1422  35.4999  0  183 
               
(ln) natural logarithm; (mc) mean centered; (ut) untransformed, not used in multivariate analysis; all 
variables are at time t-1 if not otherwise stated. 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the technological ambidexterity sample 
Variable  Firms  Obs.  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
               
ROA (t)  302  520  7.7171  8.6523  12.7380  -36.8692  79.9198 
               
ROA   302  520  7.3865  8.2637  13.3725  -55.8324  87.8834 
               
Firm size (ln)  
 
302  520  5.5134  5.5492  0.9304  1.3863  8.2721 
               
Firm age (ln)   302  520  3.2958  3.2064  0.9410  0  5.2149 
               
Environmental dyn.   302  520  23  21.4178  8.2368  0  39.6250 
               
Hybrid strategy (mc)   302  520  0.0201  0  0.5234  -1.8201  1.2840 
               
Techn. ambid. (mc)   302  520  0.1409  0  0.1735  -0.6091  0.3909 
               
Hybrid strategy (mc)  302  520  .0064  -.0032  .0887  -.4586  .3981 
× techn. ambid. (mc)                
               
Firm size (ut)   302  520  248  405.7591  497.0403  4  3,913 
               
Firm age (ut)   302  520  26  36.0231  35.2535  0  183 
               
(ln) natural logarithm; (mc) mean centered; (ut) untransformed, not used in multivariate analysis; all 
variables are at time t-1 if not otherwise stated. 39 
 
Table 6. Test of hypothesis 1  
Dependent variable  ROA (t) 
Sample  Individual ambidexterity  Technological ambidexterity 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Firm size  (ln) 
 
-0.1047  -0.2742  0.0045  0.0713 
  (0.4271)  (0.4293)  (0.3963)  (0.4108) 
         
Firm age (ln)  0.2832  0.1965  0.5854  0.5641 
  (0.4111)  (0.3980)  (0.3921)  (0.3993) 
         
ROA (t-1)  0.8051***  0.8019***  0.6222***  0.6198*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0768)  (0.0762)  (0.0767) 
         
Environmental  0.0277  0.0408  0.0010  0.0141 
dynamism  (0.0887)  (0.0900)  (0.0966)  (0.0981) 
         
Hybrid   1.1801  1.2929  0.7321  0.7011 
strategy  (0.8829)  (0.8919)  (0.8988)  (0.8756) 
         
Individual    1.2142     
ambidexterity  (0.9168)     
         
Hybrid strategy    2.8382**     
× individual ambid.    (1.3339)     
         
Technological      -0.1827 
ambidexterity      (2.6043) 
         
Hybrid strategy        12.6541*** 
× technological ambid.      (4.6075) 
         
Further  
controls 
Industry, manufacturing sector, and year dummies; country dummy;  
environmental dynamism missing dummy 
Firms  258  258  302  302 
Observations  457  457  520  520 
R2  0.61  0.62  0.50  0.50 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; time period 2005-2008; OLS regressions used in all columns; standard 
errors in parentheses clustered by firm and Huber-White robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
of unknown form 
 





Table 7. Test of hypotheses 1 to 4 
Dependent variable  ROA (t) 
Sample  Individual ambidexterity  Technological ambidexterity 
Coding  Effects  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy  Effects  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy 
Reference group  Entire 
sample 
Hybrid strat. 
w/o i. ambid. 
No-emphasis 
strategy 
Pure strategy  
and pure str. 
Pure strategy  




w/o t. ambid. 
No-emphasis 
strategy 
Pure strategy  
and pure ICT 
Pure strategy  
w/o pure ICT 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                     
Firm size (ln) 
 
-0.4343  -0.4343  -0.4343  -0.4343  -0.4343  -0.2745  -0.2745  -0.2745  -0.2745  -0.2745 
  (0.4114)  (0.4114)  (0.4114)  (0.4114)  (0.4114)  (0.4146)  (0.4146)  (0.4146)  (0.4146)  (0.4146) 
                     
Firm age (ln)  0.3067  0.3067  0.3067  0.3067  0.3067  0.5482  0.5482  0.5482  0.5482  0.5482 
  (0.3793)  (0.3793)  (0.3793)  (0.3793)  (0.3793)  (0.3935)  (0.3935)  (0.3935)  (0.3935)  (0.3935) 
                     
ROA (t-1)  0.7966***  0.7966***  0.7966***  0.7966***  0.7966***  0.6112***  0.6112***  0.6112***  0.6112***  0.6112*** 
  (0.0791)  (0.0791)  (0.0791)  (0.0791)  (0.0791)  (0.0759)  (0.0759)  (0.0759)  (0.0759)  (0.0759) 
                     
Environmental  0.0588  0.0588  0.0588  0.0588  0.0588  -0.0101  -0.0101  -0.0101  -0.0101  -0.0101 
dynamism  (0.0818)  (0.0818)  (0.0818)  (0.0818)  (0.0818)  (0.0912)  (0.0912)  (0.0912)  (0.0912)  (0.0912) 
                     
Hybrid strategy  2.9001**  4.7970***  5.6936***  2.4523  1.5578  2.0802*  4.0780***  4.3652***  -0.0028  1.9604 
and ind./techn. ambidexterity  (1.1450)  (1.6420)  (1.5888)  (1.6280)  (1.6173)  (1.0617)  (1.5141)  (1.5145)  (1.3311)  (1.8032) 
                     
Hybrid strategy  -1.8968**    0.8967  -2.3447*  -3.2392**  -1.9979**    0.2872  -4.0809***  -2.1176 
w/o ind./techn. ambidexterity  (0.8615)    (1.1159)  (1.3519)  (1.3687)  (0.8548)    (1.2342)  (1.1855)  (1.5511) 
                     
Pure strategy  0.4478  2.3447*  3.2413***    -0.8946  2.0830***  4.0809***  4.3681***    1.9632 
and pure structures/HRM/ICT  (0.8287)  (1.3519)  (1.1556)    (1.2456)  (0.6649)  (1.1855)  (1.0218)    (1.4009) 
                     
Pure strategy  1.3424  3.2392**  4.1359***  0.8946    0.1198  2.1176  2.4048*  -1.9632   
w/o pure structures/HRM/ICT  (0.8301)  (1.3687)  (1.1560)  (1.2456)    (1.0549)  (1.5511)  (1.3850)  (1.4009)   
                     
No-emphasis strategy    -0.8967    -3.2413***  -4.1359***    -0.2872    -4.3681***  -2.4048* 
    (1.1159)    (1.1556)  (1.1560)    (1.2342)    (1.0218)  (1.3850) 
                     
Further controls  Industry, manufacturing sector, and year dummies; country dummy; environmental dynamism missing dummy 
Firms  258  258  258  258  258  302  302  302  302  302 
Observations  457  457  457  457  457  520  520  520  520  520 
R2  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.52 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; time period 2005-2008; OLS regressions used in all columns; standard errors in parentheses clustered by firm and Huber-White robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form 